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The great majority of discovery requests from foreign parties appearing before U.S.
courts-including pre-trial discovery-have been carried out without provoking jurisdic-
tional conflict or international confrontations, and without necessitating resort to the
Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad (Hague Evidence Convention).'
Most of these discovery requests were conducted no differently than as if domestic parties
had been involved. Those requests that predated the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States in its definitive form, or failed to espouse the Restatement's ap-
proach that such discovery should be initiated by court order, did not require the interven-
tion of courts or other authorities outside U.S. territory.3 Nonetheless, the 'extraterritorial'
application of domestic economic legislation, particularly U.S. export controls, antitrust,
and related discovery orders, continues to arouse concern at the level of foreign govern-
ments and is an ongoing challenge to the international legal community. The recent de-
cision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Advanced Micro Devices,
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1. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, opened for
signature March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 (replacing art. 8 of the Civil Procedure Con-
vention of 1896, and arts. 8-16 of the Conventions of 1905 and 1954). See also Cynthia Day Wallace, 'Extra-
territorial' Discovery: Ongoing Challenges for Antitrust Litigation in an Environment of Global Investment, 5 J. INT'L
EcoN. L. 353, 362-92 (2002).
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987) [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD)].
3. See Guy Miller Struve, Discovery from Foreign Parties in Civil Cases Before U.S. Courts, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L
L. & POL. 1101-03, 1105, 1107, 1113 (1984).
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Inc. v. Intel Corporation4 should help to reassure foreign tribunals and litigants that U.S.
courts continue to expand their tradition of lending assistance to foreign jurisdictions in
international discovery, even at some cost to themselves.
In AMD v. Intel, the Ninth Circuit held for the first time that a U.S. federal district court
could order discovery on behalf of a complainant in an antitrust investigation of the Com-
mission of the European Communities (EC). Reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit
based their decision on grounds that an EC Commission investigation is related to a quasi-
judicial or judicial proceeding and thus qualifies as a 'proceeding before a tribunal' within
the meaning of section 1782 of Title 28 of the United States Code.
This reasoning clearly has far-reaching implications for future competition investigations
by the EC Commission involving U.S. parties, because it opens the door to the use of U.S.
courts by the EC to obtain U.S.-based documents and other evidence by complainants
("any interested person") in EC antitrust investigations and by the EC Commission (the
tribunal) itself. Under EC rules, the complainant would himself have no evidence-gathering
powers-no compulsory means of directly obtaining documents or other information from
the other parties, either in the European Community or in the United States. And yet
discovery under section 1782 holds no specific requirement for its application that similar
discovery must be allowable under the foreign jurisdictions' rules, and this is still not a
settled question among the courts of appeal, which have applied different interpretations
on this question. The Ninth Circuit has, by its latest AMD v. Intel decision, tipped the
balance, perhaps even decisively, toward the non-necessity of proving discoverability in the
foreign forum as a prerequisite to judicial assistance by a U.S. court in related foreign
proceedings. The present article looks at both sides of the foreign-discoverability debate
in the tradition of judicial assistance to foreign discovery in U.S. courts.
II. U.S. Assistance to 'Extraterritorial' Discovery in
American Courts
While the groundswell of opposition to broad U.S. discovery practices gives a high profile
to U.S. jurisdictional reach abroad, clearly not all extraterritorial reach emanates from U.S.
courts. Observers have even remarked that foreign blocking statutes-promulgated pre-
cisely to frustrate foreign (read "U.S.") discovery orders-themselves are being applied
extraterritorially:
A double standard of enforcement is unacceptable. The U.S. cannot give preferential treatment
to foreign investors [, . . . or] accord foreign investors a privilege of secrecy that it does not
recognize for its own citizens [.... or] permit foreign investors to violate its laws with impunity
while holding its citizens accountable for violations of the same laws [.1 The securities laws
apply to anyone engaged in conduct in the U.S. capital markets. Investors who come into the
U.S. and take advantage of [her] markets cannot expect the protections of secrecy or blocking
laws to follow them.
It is unacceptable that the secrecy or blocking laws of one nation will apply to a transaction
that occurs within another nation. This would constitute an extraterritorial application of the secrecy
of blocking nation's laws. [Investors] cannot have both the benefits of one nation's markets and
of another nation's secrecy laws.'
4. Advanced Micro Devices v. Intel Corp., 292 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. 2002).
5. John M. Fedders, Policing Internationalized U.S. Capital Markets: Methods to Obtain Evidence Abroad, 18
INT'L LAW. 89, 92 (1984) (Emphasis added).
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In addition to the increasing use of extraterritorial reach by some of those nations who
protected themselves against the same by means of blocking statutes, little fanfare is given
to the fact that the liberality of U.S. discovery laws has been extended to assist foreign
parties to achieve discovery in the United States. Apart from certain protected areas such
as security-related export controls and business confidentiality, any person within the
United States is at liberty to "voluntarily giv[e] his testimony or statement, or produc[e] a
document or other thing, for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal
before any person and in any manner acceptable to him. '" 6 This guarantee is codified in
section 1782,1 whose legislative history clarifies that it merely affirms a "pre-existing free-
dom.' This freedom is explicitly and almost verbatim re-affirmed in the Uniform Interstate
and International Procedure Act,9 "in order to stress the large degree of freedom existing
in this area."'1
Since as early as 1855, U.S. federal courts have been empowered by federal statute" to
grant judicial assistance to foreign tribunals and litigants in obtaining evidence located
within U.S. territory. 2 In 1964, in order to clarify, liberalize, and enhance such assistance
to foreign investigations, section 1782 of the U.S. Code, along with rule 28(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 was substantially amended. 14 The Code's section 1782 provision,
entitled "Assistance to foreign and international tribunals and to litigants before such tri-
bunals" was broadened under the 1964 amendments to include the production of docu-
ments as well as simply the giving of testimony, as was the case previous to the amendments.
In addition, the 1964 amendments replaced the words "foreign court" by the words "foreign
and international tribunals,"" wording that eventually may have proved decisive to the EC
Commission's success in applying section 1782 in AMD v. Intel.
The 1964 amendments also eliminated the word "pending" as a prerequisite to the ren-
dering of disclosure assistance to a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal and
6. FED. R. Civ. P., 28 U.S.C. § 1782(b) (2003).
7. Id. §§ 1781-1782, amended by the Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349,
94 Stat. 1156 (1980) (amendment did not affect this provision).
8. S. REP. No. 88-1580 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3789-90.
9. Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act § 302(b), 13 U.L.A. 492 (1980).
10. Id. at cmt.
11. 10 Stat. 630, ch. 140 s.2 (Mar. 2, 1855).
12. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 2, § 474 (discussing international judicial assistance in taking
evidence in the United States in aid of foreign proceedings). See also GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS: COMMENTARY & MATERIALS 921-34 (3rd ed. 1996); 10 Stat. 630, ch.
140 s.2 (Mar. 2, 1855), at 893-94 (discussing discovery pursuant to customary international judicial assistance
generally).
13. FED. R. Civ. P., 28 U.S.C. § 1782(b) (2003).
14. See S. REP. No. 88-1580 (for the legislative history of the amendments); In re Request for Assistance
from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11 th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 1005 (1989) (providing a summary of these amendments). See also Lo Ka Chun v. Lo To, 858 F.2d 1564
(11 th Cir. 1988); Tariq Mundiya, US Court Invites Foreign Litigants to u e US Discovery Laws, 42 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 356 (1993) (providing an excellent summary of current practice and case law on section 1782, and much
of the material on which the following analysis is based); Gilbert Fouche & Elliott E. Polebaum, Discovery in
the US in Aid of Foreign Litigation Under Section 1782, 24 INT'L Bus. LAW. 415 (1996).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a), app. H (2003). See Morris H. Deutsch, Judicial Assistance: Obtaining Evidence in the
United States, Under 28 U.S.C. 1782for Use in a Foreign or International Tribunal, 5 B.C. INT'L & CoMp. L. REv.
175, 182-88, 192-93 (1982) (giving an analysis of the "tribunal" issue-why the term was selected by Congress
and how its interpretation is ambiguous).
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broadened the discretion of district courts to act on foreign assistance requests. Further,
"any interested person" was added to the previously solely entitled foreign court (now
"tribunal"), thus permitting private parties and foreign officials to make application for a
discovery order.
The declared objective of the amendments was to improve judicial procedures for
"[ojbtaining evidence in the United States in connection with proceedings before foreign
and international tribunals."' 6 The legislative history states another objective as being to
"adjust [...] [American] procedures to the requirements of foreign practice and procedure"' 7
and, although the statute contains no reciprocity clause, to prompt other countries to follow
the lead of the United States and adjust their own procedures.'8
As currently understood, section 1782 "permits a district court to compel a person to
give testimony or produce documents for use in a proceeding in a foreign tribunal."' 9 U.S.
federal courts have a reasonable degree of discretion in determining whether to grant the
assistance sought under section 1782 and whether to actually issue an order.- At the same
time, they traditionally tended to interpret their discretion as tempered by an implicit
requirement that a foreign litigant may seek such discovery only if the information re-
quested would also be discoverable under the law of the foreign forum. Indeed, a majority
of the federal courts have interpreted the legislative history in this manner.2'
Contrary to the majority of case law on the subject, however, some courts have held that
section 1782 discovery did not require discoverability of the evidence in the foreign forum
prior to a U.S. court granting assistance. Notably in Application ofAsta Medica, S.A., 2  the
district court, rejecting the contrary decisions, stated that:
There is absolutely no evidence in the statute, the legislative history or the academic com-
mentary explaining the statute's enactment that suggests any congressional desire to impose
on American courts the burden of investigating foreign law on matters such as admissibility of
the evidence, its discoverability in the American or any other sense, or the authority of foreign
tribunals to order such testimony or documents in aid of their own judicial proceedings."
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the district court
decision, however, reconfirming the prevailing notion that the information sought should
be shown to be discoverable if it were located in the forum of the primary proceedings.
The court pointed out the dangers of a ruling that would expand the scope of discovery
for foreign litigants in the United States, while restricting the American litigant abroad to
the narrower foreign discovery practices.24 Moreover, in the opinion of the circuit court,
16. S. REP. No. 88-1580 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782.
17. See id. at 3788. See also In re Application of Asta Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1992).
18. See S. REP. No. 88-1580, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, at 3783.
19. In reJenoptik AG, 109 F.3d 721, 723 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
20. See S. REP. No. 88-1580, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, at 3788.
21. See, e.g., In re Court of the Comm'r of Patents for the Republic of South Africa, 88 F.R.D. 75 (E.D. Pa.
1980); John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1985); In re Application of Sumar, 123 F.R.D.
467, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago,
848 F.2d at 1156.
22. In re Application of Asta Medica, SA., 981 F.2d at 5.
23. In re Application of Asta Medica, S.A., 794 F. Supp. 442, 446 (D. Me. 1992) rev'd, 981 F.2d I (lst Cir.
1992).
24. See In re Application of Asta Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d at 5.
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such a ruling could lead to the use of section 1782 by foreign litigants to circumvent their
own national laws and procedures and thereby obtain information not available in the
foreign forum, opening the door to potential international conflict at the legislative level.25
The First Circuit accordingly held that a court's discretion is limited by a discoverability
analysis under the relevant foreign law,21 arguing that the discretion available under section
1782 should be governed by an implicit requirement that the information sought by the
foreign litigant must be discoverable in the foreign forum. Other courts of appeals, notably
the Eleventh Circuit in In re Letter of Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of
Trinidad and Tobago,2 7 have similarly held that a threshold showing of discoverability must
be shown by a foreign applicant under section 17 8 2.2s
Even the circuit courts of appeals, however, are not all in agreement on this position.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has found the requirement to
show discoverability in the foreign proceeding not accurately to reflect either the text or
the legislative history of the statute, and has accordingly adopted the opposite view to that
in the ultimate Asta Medica decision, expressly rejecting any threshold requirement for
discoverability, in support of the liberalization objectives of section 1782. The Second Cir-
cuit has emphasized that since the creation of the 1964 amendments, the clear statutory
language imposes only three prerequisites to section 1782 discovery, and these pertain to
(1) the location of the person from whom discovery is sought, (2) the intended use of the
discovery, and (3) the suitability of the applicant.2 9 The position of the Second Circuit is
perhaps best illustrated by the 1992 decision, In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines.'0
This case has important general implications for section 1782 applications.
In United Technologies International, Inc. v. Malev Hungarian Airlines,II Pratt & Whitney,
a U.S. aircraft engine producer, brought a breach-of-contract action against Malev Hun-
garian Airlines in a Hungarian court for non-performance of an alleged multimillion-dollar
sales contract. Malev, relying on the amended section 1782, in accordance with the U.S.
Federal Rules of Procedure, quickly made application for a "broad United States-style
discovery"3 order in the jurisdiction of the American plaintiff, giving no prior notice to
either the Hungarian court or Pratt & Whitney. The Connecticut federal district court
denied the request, but this response was overruled by the Second Circuit over the strong
dissent of Judge Feinberg.
The Second Circuit majority held that nothing in the text of section 1782 appeared to
support a "quasi-exhaustion" of discovery requirements of the foreign forum," and it was
not disposed to implying extra-statutory restrictions. 4 In the reasoning of the majority, the
clear wording of section 1782 did not require that a foreign court first be approached for
25. See id. at 6.
26. See id.
27. Request for Assistance, supra note 14.
28. See Fouch6 & Polebaum, supra note 14, at 417 (providing a number of such cases).
29. See In re Application of Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 1993), cer, denied sub nom. Foden v. Aldunate, 114
S. Ct. 443 (1993).
30. In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nor. United
Technologies Int'l v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, 506 U.S. 861 (1992).
31. United Technologies Int'l, 506 U.S. at 861.
32. See In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d at 105.
33. See id. at 100.
34. See Fouche & Polebaum, supra note 14, at 418.
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such an order, as required by the district court. Neither did it require that the Hungarian
court itself make the request, since "the application of any interested person" has been
allowed subsequent to the 1964 revision, not only in the precise wording of the statute, but
also in the legislative history, case law, and critical commentaries." The majority also rea-
soned that the twin purposes of section 1782, as articulated in the legislative history-that
of supporting a policy of "improving procedures for assistance to foreign and international
tribunals..." and that of "prompting foreign courts to act similarly based on [the United
States'] own generous example"36-would not be served if the discovery request were de-
nied. Lastly, the appellate majority found the district court erred in assuming that it would
be responsible for overseeing reciprocal discovery from Malev based on the argument that
reciprocity conditionality was never the intent of Congress.37
The main controversy that ensued, embodied in dissenting Judge Feinberg's reasoning,
revolved largely around three basic concerns. First, was the fact that the Malev decision
could lead to the result that "any interested person" eligible to apply for a discovery order
directly under section 1782 could abuse that privilege to circumvent the relevant foreign
(and characteristically less liberal) laws, and thus bypass available discovery practice and
procedures in the jurisdiction in which the main action is being litigated, perhaps even
"supplanting" the foreign procedures. 3
The second concern was that American parties to such proceedings could be put at a
serious disadvantage vis-h-vis their foreign counterparts, since U.S. courts do not limit
discovery to information that can be presented as evidence at trial, but open it up to all
information that appears "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evi-
dence."3" This reasoning could mean that, following Malev, U.S. courts would be bound to
compel the production of documents for a foreign tribunal in cases where the very materials
sought were not discoverable under the law of that forum.- Much the same reasoning as
that expressed by dissenting Judge Feinberg in Malev in fact went into the decision of the
First Circuit Court of Appeals the same year in Asta Medica.
4
1
Even the Malev majority noted that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow the court
to prescribe the nature and manner of discovery.42 It suggested that the district court might
consider requiring Malev to show that the discovery was unobtainable by other more ex-
pedient means, such as through the Hungarian court itself, which might in turn be required
to make a determination as to which requests were truly relevant prior to seeking discovery
in a U.S. district court.43 Presumably, the district court was similarly empowered to require
Malev to show that the discovery sought was actually necessary and that such discovery
would in fact be admissible under the lexfori.
35. See In re Application of Mfalev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d at 101.
36. Id. at 100.
37. See id. at 101. See also In reApplication of Asta Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d at 1; In reApplication ofAstaMedica,
794 F. Supp. at 446.
38. See In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d at 105.
39. FED. R. Civ. P., supra note 6, rule 26(b)(1).
40. See, e.g., In re Court of the Comm'r of Patents for the Republic of South Africa, 88 F.R.D. at 75 (U.S.
court holding denying discovery sought under section 1782 on grounds that it had not been established that
the materials requested were discoverable under South African law).
41. See In re Application ofAsta Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d at 1. See also Mundiya, supra note 14, at 365-66.
42. See FED. R. Civ. P., supra note 6, rules 26(b)(1), 26(c). See In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines,
964 F.2d at 102.
43. See In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d at 102.
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The third major concern over the Malev decision was that U.S. courts, with already
burdensome caseloads, could become the "discovery masters" of the world. These courts
could be called upon by all to do their discovery work worldwide, wherever an American
manufacturer or other party was subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. Any "interested
person" could "simply come in and ask for almost unlimited disclosure and discovery...
under the supervision of the courts of this country which would bring with it a burden
beyond present contemplation."44 In addition, in order for the U.S. court to determine
discoverability and admissibility of evidence under the foreign law, it would have to assume
enormously burdensome supplementary investigatory research into "the authority of for-
eign tribunals to order such testimony or documents in aid of their own judicial proceed-
ings." 4 In Judge Feinberg's forceful dissent, submitting that the Malev decision was un-
precedented, he stated: "This appears to be the only reported decision requiring a United
States court generally to supervise imposition of United States procedures with respect to
evidence that is all subject to the jurisdiction of the foreign court." 4
Malev represents a sort of potential 'turnabout', in that it does not involve the extrater-
ritorial reach of a U.S. statute in the matter of discovery but rather accepts a type of ex-
ploitation of the United States' broad powers of discovery to the benefit of foreign litigants
and foreign tribunals. The fear has even been expressed that, following Malev, "once a
litigant in a foreign litigation is subject to US discovery laws there is no reason why future
courts faced with section 1782 requests will not compel litigants to produce documents
located outside the United States for use in litigation in yet a third country.
47
Thus, while it is indeed desirable for one national jurisdiction to render judicial assistance
to another (foreign) forum in gathering evidence for use in its legal proceedings, the Malev
decision caused some concern that parties engaged in foreign litigation could have carte
blanche to import the broad U.S. discovery laws in order to capitalize on the liberality of
American disclosure and utilize U.S. courts to oversee and supervise discovery for cases in
which jurisdiction over the main action is elsewhere.
This concern was to some extent borne out by two subsequent cases, In re Application of
Aldunate4 and Matter of Application of Euromepa S.A., 49 also decided by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1993 and 1994 respectively, consistent with the Malev ruling. In Al-
dunate, the Second Circuit directly addressed the issue of whether an applicant must first
demonstrate that requested evidence is discoverable in a foreign jurisdiction before it can
seek documents or evidence, for use in foreign proceedings, from a U.S. court under section
1782. The court, rejecting the First Circuit's "implicit requirement" reasoning in Asta
Medica, maintained that "[t]he language makes no reference whatsoever to a requirement
of discoverability under the laws of the foreign jurisdiction." 0 In Euromepa, citing both
Malev and Aldunate, the Second Circuit went further in stating that, in the absence of some
"authoritative proof" that the foreign tribunal would reject evidence obtained under section
1782, the statute should generally be applied to provide some form of discovery assistance,
44. Id. at 104.
45. In re Application of Asta Medica, S.A., 794 F. Supp. at 446.
46. See In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d at 102-03, 105.
47. Mundiya, supra note 14, at 364.
48. In re Application of Aldunate, 3 F.3d at 54.
49. In re Application of Euromepa, S.A., 51 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir. 1995), rev'g 155 F.R.D. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
50. In re Application of Aldunate, 3 F.3d at 58-59.
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even if "closely tailored."I' Again, the Second Circuit set no requirement that the applicant
demonstrate the discoverability in the foreign forum of the materials sought. Instead, it
held that the discoverability of requested material under foreign law is but one factor to be
considered in a district court judge's exercise of discretion."2
According to section 1782(a), the district court, like any federal court, has discretion to
refuse to issue an order or to impose conditions. In exercising this discretionary power, a
court may take into account the nature and attitudes of the government of the country
from which the request emanates and the character of the proceedings in that country. The
district court withheld discovery assistance based largely on this discretion in the case of Eu-
romepa, particularly in deference to "'the nature and attitudes' of France toward discovery. " "
It concluded that to grant a petition for discovery when the foreign party had made no attempt
whatsoever to avail itself of France's own discovery procedures "would undeniably infringe
on the power that the French legislature has bestowed on its courts."5 4 For example, the court
found the foreign party had patently used section 1782 "as a substitute for discovery in France
rather than as an aid and supplement to the procedures of a French tribunal.""5 Because non-
exhaustion of domestic discovery options had already been explicitly rejected in Malev, the
district court emphasized the role of non-exhaustion in the case of Euromepa in its own dis-
cretionary analysis of the 'nature and attitudes' of France toward discovery.
In reviewing the district court's Euromepa judgment for abuse of discretion, the Second
Circuit cited Malev in reaffirming once again the "twin aims" of section 1782 of "providing
efficient means of assistance to participants in international litigation in [U.S.] federal courts
and encouraging foreign countries by example to provide similar means of assistance to
[U.S.] courts." 6 At the same time, the court emphasized the unconditional nature of section
1782: "It grants wide assistance to others, but demands nothing in return." 7 (Indeed, since
the "generous example" of the United States in 1964, no foreign state has followed the U.S.
model and granted reciprocal treatment,6 yet U.S. courts have been consistent in inter-
preting section 1782 as imposing no reciprocity requirement. 9) The Second Circuit Court
thus reversed the district court's denial of the French petitioner's section 1782 request in
Euromepa and remanded the case for further proceedings.
In 1998, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the Second Circuit's fundamental'
reasoning in In re Bayer AG,60 in similarly holding that discoverability in the foreign court
is not crucial to discovery in the United States under section 1782. In this case, the German
51. In re Application of Euromepa, SA., 51 F.3d at 1102.
52. See id. at 1098 (citing to In re Application ofAldunate, 3 F.3d at 60).
53. In re Application of Euromepa, S.A., 51 F.3d at 1098 (quoting S. REP. No. 88-1580).
54. Id. at 1097 (quoting the district court decision in In re Application of Euromepa, S.A., 155 F.R.D. 80,
83 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)).
55. In re Application ofEuromepa, S.A., 51 F.3d at 1103 (CircuitJudge Jacobs, dissenting).
56. See In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d at 100.
57. Id. at 101 (quoting Philip W. Amram, The Proposed International Convention on the Service of Documents
Abroad (Notes and Comments), 51 A.B.A.J. 650, 651 (1965)).
58. See BORN, supra note 12, at 933.
59. This stands in contrast with traditional letters rogatory that have promised reciprocal treatnent.
60. In re Bayer AG, 146 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 1998). See also In re Metallgesellschaft AG, 121 F.3d 77, 79 (2d
Cit. 1997) (holding that it was an error to refuse to authorize discovery in the United States on the ground
that the information sought was not discoverable under German law: "[wle have rejected any requirement that
evidence sought in the United States pursuant to § 1782(a) be discoverable under the laws of the foreign
country that is the locus of the underlying proceeding."
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drug manufacturer Bayer AG sought appellate review of an order from a U.S. district court
that had denied its application, pursuant to section 1782(a), to obtain discovery from a New
Jersey pharmaceutical corporation, BetaChem, Inc., for use in a patent infringement action
pending in the Court of First Instance in Spain. The Third Circuit Court, vacating the
decision and remanding the case to the district court, invoked principles of comity to take
into account cases where discovery would be privileged in the foreign jurisdiction, and it
emphasized the importance "of providing equitable and efficacious discovery" in interna-
tional contexts.6' Here the Court placed the burden of proof on the party opposing dis-
covery to demonstrate the circumstances that would justify its denial,62 going on to give
the lower court discretion in this regard.63 One commentator noted that "[w]hile this view
gives more weight to the policies and procedures of foreign courts than Euromepa, it is
puzzling why the value judgments another country has made about the role of discovery
are entitled to so little weight, since American discovery is, to say the least, both unique
and not widely admired." 64
The huge disparity in the approach taken by the Second Circuit (as exemplified in Malev,
Aldunate, and Euromepa and followed by the Third Circuit in Bayer) in contrast to the First
Circuit's approach (as exemplified in Asta Medica and reflected in the Eleventh Circuit's
Trinidad and Tobago ruling and those of a number of other U.S. circuit courts65) was not
immediately resolved. Ultimately, such a disparity can only be resolved by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit Court, by its AMD v. Intel decision, strengthened the
position consistently maintained by the Second Circuit.
The question is not always so clearly defined. Several courts of appeals have applied a
slight variant to the Asta Medica rule, distinguishing between requests from individual lit-
igants and those from tribunals, suggesting that in the latter case, "it is clear that the
discovery sought is permitted and authorized by that body."6 The Fourth, Fifth, and Elev-
enth Circuits have each made such a distinction between discovery requests from private
parties, in which case a foreign discoverability requirement was imposed, and those from a
foreign tribunal, in which case it was not imposed. For example, in Lo Ka Chun v. Lo To,
67
the Eleventh Circuit Court imposed the requirement that the discovery request must be
examined under the foreign tribunal's discovery rules when the request is from a private
litigant. In contrast, the Second Circuit in In re Application of Gianoli" made no such dis-
tinction between a tribunal and a private party in refusing to require that the litigant's
request be examined under the foreign tribunal's discovery rules.
The Fourth Circuit, in In re Letter of Request from Amtsgericht Ingolstadt,69 addressed the
question of processing a letter of request issued by a German court pursuant to the Hague
61. In re BayerAG, 146 F.3d at 195.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Molly Warner Lien, The Cooperative and Integrative Models ofInternationalJudicial Comity: Two Illustrations
Using Tranmational Discovery and Breard Scenarios, 50 CATH. U. L. REv. 519, 619 (2001).
65. E.g., the Third, Fifth, Ninth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits. See, e.g., In re Request From
Crown Prosecution Service of United Kingdom, 870 F.2d 686, 692-93 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Lo Ka Chun, 858
F.2d at 1566; In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F.2d
at 1156; John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d. 132, 136 (3d Cir. 1985).
66. In re Application for an Order for Judicial Assistance in a Foreign Proceeding in the High Court of
Justice, Chancery Division, England, 147 F.R.D. 223, 226 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
67. Lo Ka Chun, 858 F.2d at 1564.
68. In re Application of Gianoli, 3 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 965 (1993).
69. In Re Letter of Request from Amtsgericht Ingolstadt, 82 F.3d 590 (4th Cit. 1996).
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Convention concerning judicial assistance in obtaining a blood sample from a putative
father, who was a U.S. resident, in connection with a German paternity suit.70 The district
court deemed it was not necessary for the U.S. court to first determine whether German
law would have permitted discovery in like circumstances, based on the fact that the request
came from the German tribunal."' It found that "[t]he fact that the [foreign court] found
sufficient grounds to order the blood test should end this court's inquiry in this regard.""2
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's ruling, stating that consid-
erations of comity, cooperation, and reciprocity made it inappropriate to "second-guess"
the evidentiary request of a foreign court based on that forum's national discovery rules."
The appeals court concluded that the Hague Convention envisions substantial cooperation
among signatory states with respect to processing discovery requests and thus affirmed the
judgment of the district court.14
Similarly, in the ruling of the Fifth Circuit in In re Letter Rogatoryfrom the First Court of
First Instance In Civil Matters, Caracas, Venezuela, in the Matter of Electronic Data Systems
Corporation [EDS],75 in which the U.S.-based parent company EDS unsuccessfully argued
that a letter rogatory from the Venezuelan court, for the purpose of eliciting information
regarding its Venezuelan subsidiary involved in a local labour dispute, should not be hon-
oured because the information sought was not discoverable under Venezuelan law, it was
argued that "the foreign court is, presumably, the arbiter of what is discoverable under its
procedural rules .... For an American court to double-check the foreign court's request to
determine whether it is proper under the foreign nation's rules would be exactly the kind
of slight that 1782 seeks to avoid. ''7 6 The Fifth Circuit thus affirmed the district court's
ruling on the basis that "to question the discoverability of the subject matter in the subpoena
would thwart international cooperation and invite retaliation." 7
In light of these U.S. cases and the inconsistency among the appellate courts, together
with largely unaltered foreign discovery practices (particularly noticeable in civil law coun-
tries), it has been suggested that neither of the objectives of the 1964 amendments to section
1782 have been fully achieved. 71 With regard to the first goal-that of facilitating the district
courts' handling of foreign requests for discovery of evidence located in the United States-
the federal courts clearly have not been able to agree fundamentally on the grounds for
permissibility of applications. With regard to the second goal-that of encouraging other
nations, by example, to facilitate U.S.-style discovery abroad through adjusting their own
procedures-no such adjustments have materialized. In retrospect, since the scope for
evidence-gathering in the United States is well recognized to be far broader than in most
other jurisdictions, it is not entirely surprising that other governments did not expedite
70. Id. at 592.
71. Id.
72. In re Letter of Request from the Boras District Court, 153 F.R.D. 31, 34 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
73. In re Letter of Request from Amtsgericht Ingolstadt, 82 F.3d 590, 592 (4th Cir. 1996).
74. Id. at 591.
75. In re Letter Rogatory from First Court, Caracas, 42 F.3d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1995).
76. Id. at 311.
77. Id. at 308.
78. See Fouche & Polebaum, supra note 14, at 415; Philip W. Amram, The Proposed Convention on the Taking
of Evidence Abroad, 55 A.B.A. J. 651, 651-52 (1969) (discussing more on the 1964 amendments to rule 28b and
section 1782).
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similar legislation. The same governments have not been hesitant, however, to make use of
section 1782, and have increasingly done so in international civil litigation.
Indeed, it was largely the absence of the desired spontaneous foreign response that gave
rise to reciprocity requirements being given statutory force in the 1994 International Anti-
trust Enforcement Assistance Act,"9 at least for the priority area of antitrust discovery. This
law was enacted to "facilitate obtaining foreign-located antitrust evidence by authorizing
the Attorney General of the United States and the Federal Trade Commission to provide,
in accordance with antitrust mutual assistance agreements, antitrust evidence to foreign
antitrust authorities on a reciprocal basis."o
Yet the application of section 1782 is still fraught with ambiguity. In a 1997 patents
infringement case, In re Jenoptik AG,s' the German party requesting assistance succeeded
in obtaining evidence for use in the German action that was undiscoverable under German
law.s Neither the majority nor the dissent injenoptik cited to the suite of section 1782 cases
argued by the Second Circuit 3 in which the court had attempted to establish the non-
necessity of showing discoverability in the foreign forum. They determined rather that the
discoverability considerations in section 1782 cases were not applicable, arguing that this
was not an action governed by that statute. 4 The Federal Circuit inJenoptik did not in fact
have at hand any decisions or statutes that it considered to be directly on point and was
thus forced to extrapolate related information from relevant sources such as Beckman
Industries, Inc. v. International Insurance Company.5 The Ninth Circuit in Beckman had
stated that "precedent strongly favors disclosure to meet the needs of parties in pending
litigation."86
The Federal Circuit in Jenoptik reasoned that production of the documents sought by
the German party for use in the German court did not circumvent German law since the
material at issue was seen to be already discovered, its use in Germany being precluded
only by the protective order.8 7 This reasoning sidestepped the concerns aired in the earlier
section 1782 cases, precisely that foreign parties might misuse the liberal U.S. judicial
assistance to circumvent the foreign discovery rules and procedures of the forum state.
By releasing evidence that would not be discoverable in the forum state, Jenoptik set a
precedent that any litigant may obtain information that is not discoverable in a foreign
forum, by filing a related suit in a U.S. court."8 Some observers have expressed that the
potential for circumvention of foreign law through parallel lawsuits in American courts is
too great and violates the spirit of U.S. law and public policy.89 Now, with the added pre-
79. International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6212 (1994).
80. International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-438, 108 Stat. 4597 (1994)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6212 (1994)).
81. In re jenoptik AG, 109 F.3d at 721. See Suzanne G. Collins, In re Jenoptik AG: The Fine Line Between
Judicial Assistance and Circumvention of Foreign Law in International Discovery, 23 N.C.J. ]Nr'L L. & CoM. REG.
691 (1998) (giving the facts and analysis of the case).
82. See In rejenoptikAG, 109 F.3d at 724 (NewmanJ, dissenting).
83. See Collins, supra note 81, at 703.
84. See In re7enoptik AG, 109 F.3d at 723. See also Collins, supra note 81, at 697-
85. Beckman Indus. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1992).
86. Id.
87. See In rejenoptikAG, 109 F.3d at 723. See also Collins, supra note 81, at 707.
88. See Collins, supra note 81, at 708.
89. See, e.g., id. at 694.
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cedent of AMD v. Intel, U.S. courts have opened the door to accepting an even greater
workload, even though already overburdened, in the ongoing interest of providing essen-
tially unilateral foreign judicial assistance.
11. Conclusion
No one disputes the fact that broad assertions of 'extraterritorial' discovery power on the
part of the United States have been responsible for countermanding blocking legislation in
Europe (and elsewhere, notably Canada-), as well as for resort to diplomatic and private
protests." Less attention has been given to assistance to foreign tribunals and even private
parties by U.S. courts in matters of foreign discovery.
The question might still be raised as to whether more official measures should be sought
for reciprocity in the type of judicial assistance afforded by U.S. courts. This question takes
on a heightened profile as some of those countries that have most vehemently resisted
,extraterritorial' U.S. discovery have become increasingly adept at using U.S. discovery
practices to their advantage, as most recently seen in AMD v. Intel. A legitimate corollary
question is whether this is not one step closer to the concerns expressed over the Malev
ruling; namely, that U.S. courts, already over-burdened, could become the "discovery mas-
ters" of the world.
Finding thejuste milieu between reasonable comity considerations and exorbitant judicial
assistance becomes an increasing challenge, particularly in the virtual absence of interna-
tional discovery reciprocity. At the same time, since U.S. discovery is already widely viewed
as exceeding the scope of most other regimes, such assistance on the part of the United
States may be deemed necessary to promote goodwill and to continue the quest for mutual
co-operation in international discovery. Enhancing the spirit of cooperation among sig-
natory countries of the Hague Convention, which already serves to supplement pre-existing
general principles of comity among countries, still has some way to go.
The Doha Development Agenda, launched by the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the
World Trade Organization in 2001, offered an opportunity to include the issue of "com-
petition" on the agenda for the first time in a multilateral trade round. This would have
allowed the question of international co-operation in 'extraterritorial' discovery and related
reciprocity-at least with regard to antitrust investigations, the most fertile ground for such
requests-to be substantially addressed. The recent failure of the Fifth WTO Ministerial
in Cancun to achieve a consensus among its Member States to confirm this issue as a part
of the current trade round, and its abandonment as an agenda item by its strongest pro-
ponent (the European Union), does not bode well for an early global solution. But one
thing is certain: competition/antitrust issues will not die. Their profile has been irrevocably
raised. The challenge is still great and the opportunity ripe.
90. See CYNTHIA DAY WALLACE, THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND LEGAL CONTROL: HOST STATE SOV-
EREIGNTY IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION ch. XIV, § 2(b)(i) (2002).
91. See id. at ch. XIV, § 3(c). See also Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 31, 176 (1972-1973).
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